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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY-COLLISION-DUTY OF THIRD VESSEL TO GIVE w ARNING-
w ashington, a private merchantman proceeding north at night through a 
large United States Navy formation steaming west, received no warning 
from formation commanders that Ruchamkin, an escort, was rejoining 
from the east. Uninformed of Washington's presence and ordered to re-
sume station expeditiously, Ruchamkin entered the formation at high speed. 
Despite late radical maneuvers upon discovery of Washington close aboard, 
Ruchamkin was struck by the latter's bow with resulting damage to both 
ships. On reciprocal libels, held, decree for Washington's owner. In addi-
tion to Ruchamkin's failure to anticipate Washington, the United States 
was negligent in that the formation commanders made no effective effort 
to caution Washington of the imminent peril created by Ruchamkin's 
obedience to their orders. The Ruchamkin, (E.D. Va. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 97. 
Waiver of federal immunity to suit for damage caused by a public 
vessel1 is today understood to encompass not only actions in which the 
public vessel is a physical instrument of harm, but also those in which 
injury results from negligent conduct on the part of ship's personnel in the 
vessel's operation2 or possession,3 regardless of physical contact. It has long 
been clear that such negligence-normally fixed by reference to applicable 
navigational rules4-may be a causative factor in a collision despite corporeal 
removal of the wrongdoer, as in the infrequent case where vessel A, without 
impact, crowds vessel B into collision with c,s or where a tugmaster, though 
physically apart from his tow, causes it to be struck by an innocent ship.0 
The recent perfection of effective marine search radar has significantly ex-
panded the scope of judicial inquiry in resolving problems of inter-ship 
responsibility.7 While there has not yet emerged a generic duty to utilize 
1 " .•• [A libel] in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States 
... for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States ... .'' 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 
46 u.s.c. (1952) §781. 
2 Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). 
3 Federal liability respecting the use of public vessels has apparently been extended 
beyond the requirement of operation announced in Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United 
States, note 2 supra. To the effect that mere possession is now sufficient, see Thomason 
v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 105. 
4 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 796 (1939). The incident in the principal case was controlled 
by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Id. at 802. These 
regulations, ratified by Congress in 1951 [65 Stat. 406-420 (1951), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §§144-
147], were originally adopted by the most recent (1948) international conference on 
safety of life at sea. For a history of international cooperation regarding navigational 
safety, see 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8th ed., §265 et seq. (1955). 
5 The Susquehanna, (E.D.N.Y. 1905) 134 F. 641; The Sisters, 1 Prob. Div. 117 (1875). 
See generally, GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLLISION §223 (1949). 
6 The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898); Bouchard Transportation Co. v. The 
Providence, (2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 404. Cf. Compania Maritima Samsoc Limitada v. 
Moran Towing & Transp. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 607. 
7 A useful discussion of the principles, limitations, and import of modern navigational 
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available radar for evasion of collision,8 the availability of radar may affect 
the duty of a commander who manifests his assumption of responsibility 
for another's safe navigation. Specifically, it may be said that a radar-
equipped vessel which, by military relation or positive acts of intercession, 
inspires justifiable reliance in a second vessel that the first will give warn-
ing in case of danger, creates in herself a duty to give such warning.0 Thus 
a convoy commodore10 or the commander of an escort vessel,11 aware of 
danger to ships in his charge, is negligent if he omits giving them timely 
warning of possible harm. So also where two vessels are about to cross 
in a heavy fog, a third vessel which interjects a whistle signal indicating 
the navigational procedure to be followed will be negligent if she then 
fails to warn the crossing vessels of their dangerous proximity as it appears 
on her radar.12 It is apparent that these cases represent no more than spe-
cialized applications of an established tort concept, viz., that A, having 
undertaken to assist an imperiled B, must do so with reasonable care.13 
The court's finding in the principal case, however, that the "special circum-
stances"14 and "general prudential"10 international navigational rules im-
posed a legal duty on the formation commanders to caution Washington, 
a vessel not in their original charge, would appear to conflict with the 
radar appears in WYLIE, THE UsE OF RADAR AT SEA (1953). See also Hogan, "The Use 
of Radar as a Legal Duty," The J.A.G. J., Sept. 1948, p. 3. 
s Compare The Medford, (E.D.N.Y. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 622, noted in 33 VA. L. REv. 
71 (1947), with British Transportation Commission v. United States, (4th Cir. 1956) 230 
F. (2d) 139. See also Biesemeier and Bergs, "Some Legal Aspects of Radar Conning," 
The J.A.G. J., Dec. 1953, p. 3. To the effect that possession of radar in no way diminishes 
or alters duties under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, see 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, recommendation 19 (1948). 
9 Such a rule is to be inferred from the decision or dicta in the following cases: 
Chesapeake &: O. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., (E.D. l\Iich. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 830; 
United States v. Adstratus, (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 883; United States v. The Australia 
Star, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 472, cert. den. 338 U.S. 823 (1949); Publicover v. Alcoa 
S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 672; The Sobieski, 81 LL L. REv. 51 (1947), affd. 
[1949] Prob. 313; Glaucus and City of Florence, [1948] Prob. Div. 95. 
10 The Sobieski, note 9 supra; Glaucus and City of Florence, note 9 supra; Publicover 
v. Alcoa S.S. Co., note 9 supra. 
11 United States v. Australia Star, note 9 supra; United States v. Adstratus, note 9 supra. 
12 "The Mead, having injected herself into the picture and having sounded a two-
blast signal which might indicate to The Meteor that the unseen No. 12 was to pass 
The Mead's starboard, was guilty of misleading The Meteor when she did not warn her 
that The No. 12 was ignoring her signal and was heading into The Meteor's path." 
Chesapeake &: O. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., note 9 supra, at 834. 
13 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 184 et seq. (1955). 
14 "In obeying and construing these Rules due regard shall b_e had to all dangers of 
navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances . . . which may render a 
departure from the above Rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger." 65 Stat. 
419 (1951), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §146k. 
16 "Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel ... from the consequences 
... of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice 
of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case." 65 Stat. 419 (1951), 33 U.S.C. 
(1952) §147a. For a general construction of these two rules, see HILBF.RT, THE INTER-
NATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD AT SEA 126 (1938). 
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basic tenet of the tort principle just stated: A has no original duty, save 
perhaps a moral one, to go to imperiled B's assistance, except where the 
peril was created by A's antecedent misconduct.16 It can be hypothesized (1) 
by permitting Washington to enter the formation, the commanders under-
took to assist her, and were then bound to exercise due care to avoid injury 
to her, or (2) that by ordering Ruchamkin to station they were guilty of 
prior misconduct imperiling Washington. The court is silent as to these 
possibilities, however, so the decision may be construed as imputing to the 
formation commanders an original duty toward a strange vessel to assist 
in the latter's safe navigation. Even the potential implication of such a 
legal duty should be effaced.17 Judicially to derive consent to give warning 
from acts no more indicative of consent than steaming in sea-lanes while 
equipped with radar is to confuse and compound the already exacting task 
of keeping one's own vessel out of harm's way. 
Michael Scott 
16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 184 et seq. (1955). 
17 Note the following statement from Biesemeier and Bergs, "Some Legal Aspects of 
Radar Conning," J.A.G. J., Dec. 1958, p. 5: "Yet another element of fault was found 
. . • in that there was a duty upon the escorting naval vessel to warn her charge by 
signal lights, whistle signals, or radio that she was standing into danger. • • • It is the 
authors' opinion that this places a serious and what could amount to an intolerable 
burden on the escort." 
